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He writes, “In a world with much uncertainty, I think many people
are seeking direction.” (p.27). Now certainly this is true. Maxwell
continues, “The Golden Rule can provide that. It never changes,
even as circumstances do. It gives a solid predicable direction
every time it’s used. And best of all, it actually works.” What better
to have when lost, than a compass? So when morally lost, who
would not want a moral compass? On these grounds, Maxwell
would have us believe that the Golden Rule is a standard of moral-
ity and that we should act in accordance with it. 
Literal Golden Rule Problems
I take Maxwell’s version to be the traditional, literal version of
the Golden Rule. It is more-or-less the version that most of us
have grown up knowing and loving. Yet, as is the case with so
much of what is traditional, following the traditional Golden
Rule is an unreflective reaction to inherited customs. “The
Golden Rule,” writes, Neil Duxbury in the article ‘Golden Rule
Reasoning, Moral Judgment, and Law’ in the Notre Dame Law
Review (2009), “is a routine principle of action... the Rule use-
fully serves as an interruptive tactic, like counting to ten to pre-
vent losing our temper, or as a way of checking our standards...
But most of the time the Rule is practiced unreflectively – the
spontaneity of so much social action makes this inevitable” (p.84).
So be it. And as is true with so much of what is traditional, the
Golden Rule comes with some very traditional criticisms. 
Consider, Maxwell asks, where is the loser in following the
traditional Golden Rule? Well, as an obvious example, the loser
is the victim of somebody who wishes to be treated brutally who
abides by the Rule; or the person on the receiving end of some-
one who wishes that others would always be nothing but honest
with them at all times. In such cases, abiding literally by the
Golden Rule would violate what Harry Gensler, in Ethics: A
Contemporary Introduction (2011), calls ‘regular moral norms’ –
what I will call ‘ordinary moral principles’ – norms and princi-
ples each of us would normally accept so that we would agree
that the violation of them would be morally wrong or, at least,
inappropriate. Yet treating somebody brutally would be to follow
the traditional Golden Rule literally, if that’s how you want to
be treated. This is a rather large loophole. And hot on its heels,
another common criticism of the Golden Rule is that it does
not say in what specific ways any given person should act, nor
does it explain why some action is morally correct or incorrect. 
Another criticism is that just because some version of the tra-
ditional Golden Rule can be found from culture to culture and
religion to religion does not mean that people within that cul-
ture or religion actually believe it to be true, much less practice
it. To add to this, even if we had some universal understanding
of what it is to be treated well and poorly, it simply isn’t true
that we all want to be treated well. Some people might (even
rationally) think that they do not deserve to be treated well;
others may not understand what it is to be treated well; some
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he Golden Rule is (roughly) as follows: treat others as
you would have others treat you. Philosophical reactions
to it vary; it has  both supporters and detractors. In
any case, almost nobody who thinks critically about
morality takes the literal version of the Golden Rule seriously,
since there are just too many problems with it. To demonstrate
this, I will look at a literal version of the Golden Rule espoused
by John C. Maxwell, a well-known and influential motivational
speaker, and briefly discuss some of the obvious problems that it
faces. I will then examine a more sophisticated version of the
Golden Rule espoused by philosopher Harry Gensler. While
able to overcome some of the problems of the literal Golden
Rule, Gensler’s version nevertheless shares a common difficulty
with it: in both cases, the moral agent is asked to imagine them-
selves in the place of another. Maxwell thinks this is easily done,
and Gensler asks for vividness and accuracy in this act of imagi-
nation. I wish to show that any version of the Golden Rule that
takes seriously the need to imagine oneself in the place of another
is to ask one to do the impossible, so any versions of the Golden
Rule that require this should be rejected.
An Argument For The Golden Rule
In Ethics 101 (2005), John C. Maxwell claims that the Golden
Rule should be accepted for the following reasons (pp.18-23): 
1. The Golden Rule is accepted by most people.
2. The Golden Rule is easy to understand.
3. The Golden Rule is a win-win philosophy.
4. The Golden Rule is a compass when you need direction.
Therefore
5. The Golden Rule should be accepted.
The claim that the Golden Rule is accepted by most people
is arguably the most common feature of just about any discus-
sion of the Golden Rule. Indeed, many religions and moral sys-
tems, from Islam and Christianity, Nigerian proverbs to Jain-
ism, do have some version of it. And what could be simpler than
to treat others as you would want to be treated? To do so, just
imagine yourself in the place of the other; if, while in the place
of the other, you would want to be treated as you were treating
them, then treat them that way; if not, then don’t.
Further, as Maxwell reflects, “When you live by the Golden
Rule, everybody wins. If I treat you as well as I desire to be
treated, you win. If you treat me likewise, I win. Where is the
loser in that?” (p.23). The point is obvious: presuming all of us
want to be treated well, faced with a choice of a world where
individuals are treating others as they want to be treated, or one
where they are not, it seems obvious to choose the world where
everybody is acting in such a seemingly reciprocal way. Plain
enough. Thus, Maxwell’s Premise 3.
Maxwell’s fourth premise is a type of guidance step, if you will.
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may simply not care one way or the other. 
So insofar as far as the Golden Rule is a compass, I dare say
that as Maxwell presents it, it is a broken compass, always point-
ing in the same direction, because, as I mentioned, it says noth-
ing about A) The way others want to be treated relative to one’s
own desires of how to be treated; B) Which preferences are
morally superior to others; and C) What makes certain prefer-
ences for behavior morally superior to others. This is hardly
suitable for a moral precept. 
On these accounts, Maxwell assumes far too much for his
argument to work. 
So much for the Golden Rule taken literally, then.
Gensler’s Golden Rule
I take these criticisms of the Golden Rule as standard and, with
the exception of my metaphor of Maxwell’s broken compass, I
take no credit for them. The fact is, these criticisms are obvi-
ous, so it may seem that I’m swinging at some low-hanging fruit.
In his chapter on the Golden Rule, for example, Gensler is quick
to note that one of the problems with it is that it does not take
into account the fact that people stand in different relations to
each other and in different sets of circumstances: it does not
take it into account that you and I will be in a different situa-
tion with different beliefs, attitudes, and cultural practices.
Second, the Golden Rule does not take into account the fact
that the follower of the Golden Rule may well have ‘defective
desires’. If the masochist were a follower of the Golden Rule,
their reasoning could be formulated as follows (following
Gensler): ‘I want to be tortured by Xavier; therefore, I should
torture Xavier’. But, of course, any form of torture is usually
unwanted, unwarranted, and morally wrong. Thus, the Golden
Rule taken literally can lead to absurdities.
So, Gensler reformulates the Golden Rule. He begins by
noting three key features of it:
1. A same situation clause.
2. A present attitude clause.
3. A don’t combine clause; Do not combine the following:
a. I do something to another.
b. I’m unwilling that this be done to me in the same situation.
The question for the Golden Rule, then, is not, ‘Am I now
willing that this be done to me in my present situation?’ Rather,
the question surrounding the Golden Rule should be, ‘Am I
now willing that if I were in the same situation, then this be
done to me?’ As Gensler writes, The Golden Rule “is about
our present reaction to a hypothetical case. It isn’t about how we
would react if we were in the hypothetical case” (p.84). There
is a subtlety here. Imagine the case of a judge sentencing a crim-
inal. The Golden Rule says ‘Treat others as you would want
to be treated’. Criminals want to be free, not incarcerated;
therefore, if the judge were to put herself in the place of the
criminal, the judge would want to be free; therefore, the judge
should not incarcerate the criminal. This is obviously wrong-
headed. Imagine now a case where the judge imagined herself
in the place of the criminal, but with the present attitudes and
beliefs of the judge. The judge/criminal would realize that as a
criminal she poses a threat to society, and that as judge, the
best thing for society would be to be incarcerated. Thus, the
judge/criminal would hold that “While I do not want to be
incarcerated, I nevertheless realize that I should be; I, there-
fore, consent to being incarcerated.” And, so, by stipulating a
same-situation and present attitude clause, Gensler’s version
of the Golden Rule is able to avoid the problems of the diver-
sity of desires that the traditional Golden Rule faces. 
A Conceptual Flaw
Although Gensler is trying to be fair and consistent by taking
into account relevant differences of situations, it remains unclear
whether what he is asking a moral agent to do is actually possi-
ble. Consider:















































“To apply the Golden Rule, we need to know what effect our actions
have on the lives of others. And we need to imagine ourselves, vividly
and accurately, in the other person’s place on the receiving end of
the action. When combined with knowledge and imagination, the
Golden Rule is a powerful tool of moral thinking.” (p.84).
So we are to ‘vividly and accurately’
imagine ourselves in the place of another.
Maxwell holds the same condition. My
question is, even if your imaginations
have been vivid, how can you know that
you have accurately imagined yourself in
the place of another? If we are to take the
‘vividly and accurately’ criteria seriously
and yet it cannot be met, then the Golden
Rule cannot itself be met and, therefore,
it cannot be a suitable moral standard. 
In the movie Being John Malkovich
(2000), one of the characters, Craig, real-
izes that by entering through a small
door he can experience whatever the
actor John Malkovich experiences. Now
a puzzle arises – let’s call it the
‘Malkovich Dilemma’. Presumably,
whoever Craig is, Craig is that person
and no other. In the parlance of the
metaphysics of identity, one might say that what it is to be X is
that it stands in relation to another thing Y such that X is not Y
and Y is not X. Given such an identity condition, ‘each thing is
what it is and is not another thing’ (a phrase attributed to Bishop
Joseph Butler). If this is so, and Craig (X) pops into John
Malkovich’s (Y’s) mind and experiences precisely what Malkovich
experiences, then how can it be said that Craig is still Craig and
not John Malkovich? This is the Malkovich Dilemma. Con-
versely, if Craig has Malkovich’s experiences and yet Craig is still
very much aware that he is Craig (as is the case in the movie) then
Craig, as a separate mental, conscious being, could not know that
the experiences he’s having are the ones Malkovich is having,
because, after all, Craig is not Malkovich. Furthermore, if Craig
were apparently having the same experiences as Malkovich, but
reacts differently to them, it seems clear that Craig wouldn’t actu-
ally be having the same experiences, since our reactions to our
experiences are still part of the web of our experiences. If X had
exactly Y’s experiences, then this would include all relevant expe-
riences for the same duration, with the same vividness and mean-
ing, otherwise it wouldn’t be the same experience. But if X truly
does have Y’s experiences, including the precise reactions that Y
would have, how is X different from Y? There would simply be
no difference between the two. Indeed, there would only be one
experiencer, since strictly the same experiences could not have
both difference and identity.
So, why does this fancy metaphysics spell trouble for the
Golden Rule? Well, if what I will call the ‘identity condition’ –
that one must be able to imagine one’s self in the place of another
– is meant in a strong sense, as Maxwell and Gensler imagine it
to be, then if the identity condition is an impossibility, so too is
the Golden Rule. And since it is impossible to truly imagine
one’s self in the place of another in a strong sense, even a mod-
ified Golden Rule is thus an impossibility.
One final consideration. Perhaps you think I am being unjustly
dismissive of the idea of putting one’s self in the place of another,
and that I should be a little more charitable toward Gensler.
After all, Gensler tells us that when I am imagining myself in
the place of another, I am to imagine myself only as having those
properties of another person “that I think
are or might be” relevant to the situation
(p.84, my emphasis). However, even if we
were to adopt a softer, more charitable
interpretation, the simple fact of the
matter is that as long as I am allowed to
act on what I merely think are the relevant
properties and circumstances, then I can
no longer be asked to accurately imagine
myself in the place of another, if ‘accu-
rately’ means what we normally take it to
mean – ‘being precisely factually true’. 
Conclusion
We can be even more charitable with
Gensler. He tells us that the Golden Rule
is a ‘consistency principle’, and that “It
does not replace regular moral norms”
(p.81); and so, “the Golden Rule does not
compete with principles like ‘It’s wrong to
steal’ or ‘One ought to do whatever maximizes enjoyment.’ The
Golden Rule operates on a different level”:
“The golden rule captures the spirit behind morality. It helps us to see
the point behind moral rules. It engages our reasoning, instead of
imposing an answer. It counteracts self-centeredness. And it concretely
applies ideas like fairness and concern. So, the Golden Rule makes a
good one-sentence summary of what morality is about.” (p.89).
Here however the problem with the Golden Rule is fully
exposed. It is precisely because 1) It is not an ‘infallible guide’
to what is right or wrong; 2) It doesn’t say what specific acts to
do; 3) It “does not replace regular moral norms”; and 4) It asks
that the moral agent do something impossible, that any version
of the Golden Rule that would still be recognizable as the
Golden Rule doesn’t really do anything. 
Notice that when somebody follows the Golden Rule to the
letter and by doing so does something morally bad, our default
position is to say, “Well, they clearly had defective desires,” or
“They made a mistake because they did not take everything into
consideration.” In other words, the Golden Rule defers to our
ordinary moral principles. Consider further, if the default posi-
tion in cases where the Golden Rule fails is our ordinary moral
principles, then the Golden Rule cannot ground our ordinary
moral principles. If ethics is the inquiry into the basic claims of
morality, then upon philosophical scrutinization of the Golden
Rule, we find that, in the words of Quine, “there is nothing to
scrute” after all. We should focus our attention on ordinary
moral principles instead. 
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